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Abstract
Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overesti-
mation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert
eort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A
rational manager tends to delegate the critical task to the agent more often than given by
the e!cient task allocation. In contrast, an overconfident manager is more likely to hoard
responsibility, i.e. to delegate the critical task less often than a rational manager. In fact, a
manager with a su!ciently high ability and a moderate degree of overconfidence increases
the total welfare by hoarding responsibility and exerting more eort than a rational man-
ager. Finally, we derive the conditions under which responsibility hoarding can persist in
an organization, showing that the bias survives as long as the overconfident manager can
rationalize the observed output by underestimating the ability of the agent.
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1 Introduction
Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral pattern that involves overestimating the own
capabilities, especially in tasks with a partially stochastic outcome (Svenson (1981), Lichtenstein
et al. (1982), Russo and Schoemaker (1992), Soll (1996)). Although the degree of overconfidence
may vary with the type of task (Grieco and Hogarth (2009)), it is generally found to persist
when individuals assess the probability of their own success or the relative standing of their
performance compared to others (Klayman et al. (1999)).
While the behavioral pattern of overconfidence and its eects on financial decision-making
have been studied extensively (see for instance De Bondt and Thaler (1996), Barber and Odean
(2000), Deaves et al. (2008), or Malmendier and Tate (2005)), the eects of overconfidence
on organizational performance are not fully understood yet. In particular, the question how
manager overconfidence aects organizational performance by biasing the manager’s delegation
and task distribution choices has not been studied so far.
To investigate these eects, we introduce a model, in which a manager and an agent can
exert eort into a joint production that consists of two distinct tasks with unequal impact on
the output. The allocation of the tasks is at the discretion of the manager, who decides whether
to perform the "critical" task (i.e. the task with the higher impact on the output) himself or
to delegate it to the agent.1
We show that an overconfident manager tends to hoard responsibility, i.e. to assign the
critical task more often to himself than a fully rational manager would. Responsibility hoarding
takes place, even though it is individually suboptimal for the manager, who suers from a higher
cost of eort by performing the critical task instead of the other task.
We also show that, despite adding to the overconfident manager’s eort cost, responsibility
hoarding may actually increase the total welfare of the involved parties. As long as the over-
confident manager’s self-perception bias is not too large, the total welfare eect can be positive,
because the amount of eort exerted by the overconfident manager is closer to the e!cient
level than the amount provided by a fully rational manager, who chooses a payo maximizing
eort level, generally below the welfare maximizing level. Hence, by overestimating his own pro-
ductivity and exerting a correspondingly greater amount of eort, the overconfident manager
typically engages in less free-riding than his rational counterpart.
Finally, we show that responsibility hoarding can persist in an organization, as long as the
overconfident manager can rationalize the overestimation of the own ability by underestimating
the ability of the agent. The more leeway an overconfident manager has to rationalize the
observed outcome without having to adapt his positively biased assessment of the own ability
level, the more likely it is to observe persistent responsibility hoarding in an organization. We
determine the conditions for persistent responsibility hoarding in our model without assuming
that managers are biased in the way that they update information. Adding biased information
processing to the model (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Mobius et al. (2011)) will
intuitively increase the range of parameter values for which responsibility hoarding is a persistent
1We use the male pronoun for the manager and the female pronoun for the agent, because males are generally
found to exhibit a higher degree of overconfidence than females (see e.g. Barber and Odean (2001), Correll (2001),
Bengtsson et al. (2005)).
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bias.2
Most of the existing literature on overconfidence in managerial settings is focused on the
exaggerated investment risks taken by overconfident managers. While Barber and Odean (2000)
and Deaves et al. (2008) report excessive trading by overconfident traders, Camerer and Lovallo
(1999) observe excessive market entries in an experimental setting. Malmendier and Tate (2005)
argue that managerial overconfidence leads to distortive investment behavior and demonstrate
that data on CEO investments in the own company are in line with their overconfidence model.
Hackbarth (2008) shows that overconfident managers tend to bias the capital structure of the
firm towards higher debt levels. Similar results can be found in Ben-David et al. (2007) who
show that companies with overconfident CFOs have a significantly dierent capital structure
than other firms. Furthermore, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that overconfident managers
also tend to overpay in mergers and even initiate value-destroying ones. Interestingly, this
bias is sometimes advantageous for the firm value. For instance, Palomino and Sadrieh (2011)
show that managerial overconfidence can be advantageous concerning financial decisions. They
analyze a model in which overconfident portfolio managers, who share profits, may exhibit
risk attitudes that are more in line with the investors’ risk attitude than fully rational risk-
averse managers. Analyzing data of large publicly traded firms from 1980 to 1994, Galasso and
Simcoe (2011) present evidence that overconfident CEOs have a significantly higher probability
to initiate corporate innovation.
In a team production setting, Gervais and Goldstein (2007) study a firm with complemen-
tary production technology and show that the presence of an overconfident agent can increase
the firm output, because it helps the agents to coordinate on a high eort level, and therefore,
overcome the free-rider problem. Furthermore, Santos-Pinto (2008) shows that firms can bene-
fit from using interdependent incentive schemes when workers exhibit have wrong beliefs about
their coworkers’ abilities. Regarding individual performance, Weinberg (2009) for instance shows
that a moderate overestimation of the own ability can be advantageous compared to a correct
assessment, because it allows the overconfident individuals to undertake more challenging tasks
that raise their expected output and utility. Recent experimental findings by Sautmann (2011)
support the notion that overconfident agents accept lower wage oers, while Santos-Pinto (2010)
shows that firms using tournaments as incentives can achieve greater profits, if agents have a
positive self-image. Similarly, Ludwig et al. (2011) find that moderate overconfidence can im-
prove the agent’s performance in a Tullock contest relative to an unbiased opponent. These
results are supported by the recent experiment of Kinari et al. (2011), reporting a significant
positive impact of overconfidence on productivity in tournaments. Furthermore, Englmaier
(2011) argues that firms should hire overoptimistic managers to ensure the implementation of
certain investment strategies in R&D tournaments.
Regarding the literature on the delegation of tasks in a principal-agent model, we are, to the
best of our knowledge, the first to take overconfidence into account. Prendergast (1995) suggests
a model where a manager has discretion over task assignments and may exhibit responsibility
hoarding, i.e. may delegate less tasks to the agent than a rational manager would. The result is
2Some authors have presented models to analyze the conditions under which overconfidence may emerge (see
e.g. Rabin and Schrag (1999)). In contrast, our model takes the existence of overconfidence as given, but analyzes
the conditions under which it can survive in an organizational setting.
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driven by the assumption that the manager can earn future rents from the on-the-job training
that performing the additional tasks provides. This model of rational responsibility hoarding is
especially useful when studying professions with extraordinary high rents for job experience, e.g.
surgeons, pilots, or lawyers. Note, however, that — as our analysis shows - even in such settings
any degree of rational responsibility hoarding may be amplified by the manager’s overconfidence.
If the output of several tasks cannot be measured separately and the principal has to
delegate at least one task, Itoh (1994) and Itoh (2001) find that the principal will execute some
tasks himself or delegate all tasks to only one agent if the agents are risk averse. Gürtler (2008)
extends this model and compares partial delegation, where the principal carries out one task and
the other task is carried out by the agent, to complete delegation, where each agent specializes
in one of the tasks.
2 Basic model
Consider a joint production setting, in which a manager and an agent can exert eort to generate
a shared output. The total output \ is a function of the outcomes \1 and \2 of the tasks 1 and
2, correspondingly. A crucial assumption is that the two tasks dier in their impact on the total
output, where w.l.o.g. we assume that task 1 is the critical task, i.e. it tends to have higher
impact on total output than the non-critical task 2. Using an additive production function,
we introduce the parameter  that measures the relative impact of task 1 compared to task 2.
Hence, the total output \ is defined as:
\ = \1 + (1 )\2> with  5
µ
1
2
> 1
¶
For simplicity, both manager and agent are risk neutral and benefit to the same extent
from the total output, i.e. both individuals receive the same share of
1
2
\ . We assume that the
eort levels as well as the output of both tasks are not observable by the firm. Only the total
output \ is observable for all parties. Either player can be assigned to perform either task,
where the task allocation is chosen by the manager at the outset of each period. The allocation
must be complete and bijective, i.e. both tasks must be allocated and each must be allocated to
a dierent player, because no player can perform both tasks in the same period. The outcome
of each task m is endogenous, depending on the true ability dl and the chosen eort hl of the
player l performing the task:
\m = dl · hl> with l =P [dqdjhu]> D[jhqw] and m = 1> 2=
Furthermore, the individual eort cost F(hl) is strictly convex:
F(hl) =
f
2
h2l > f 5 R+=
To simplify the discussion, we distinguish between those task allocation choices, in which
the critical task 1 is performed by the manager (non-delegation), and those, in which the critical
task 1 is allocated to the agent (delegation). More formally we define:
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Definition 1 A delegation choice is a task allocation in which the critical task 1 is allocated
to the agent and the non-critical task 2 is allocated to the manager. In case of non-delegation
the critical task 1 is allocated to the manager and the non-critical task 2 is carried out by the
agent.
Definition 2 A task allocation is individually optimal if it maximizes the manager’s utility.
Definition 3 A task allocation is e!cient if it maximizes the total welfare of all involved
parties.
Following Gervais and Goldstein (2007) we characterize an overconfident manager as some-
one who systematically overestimates his own ability:
Definition 4 An overconfident manager has an overly optimistic perception of his own abil-
ity, i.e.
dRFP = dP + e
where dP denotes the manager’s true ability and the parameter e A 0 his self-perception bias or
the degree of his overconfidence.
Finally, we use the definitions above to characterize responsibility hoarding.
Definition 5 Responsibility hoarding occurs when a manager performs the critical task (task
1) himself, even though a delegation choice is individually optimal for him.
3 Perfect information on agent’s ability
In the first step, we assume that the agent’s ability is common knowledge, i.e. both the manager
and the agent have perfect information on the agent’s ability. We start by investigating the
e!cient task allocation choice (first-best case) and then proceed to the delegation choices of
a fully rational manager and of an overconfident manager. Comparing the three results, we
first show that fully rational managers delegate the critical task more often than is e!cient.
Next, we show that overconfidence always leads to less delegation compared to an equilibrium
with fully rational managers. Finally, we prove that the manager’s biased self-perception may
increase e!ciency, because responsibility hoarding can be beneficial for the total welfare of
the involved parties, as long as the increase in the overconfident manager’s contribution to
firm output over-compensates the loss due to his individually suboptimal delegation and eort
choices.
3.1 E!cient task allocation (first-best case)
Assume that the critical task 1 is carried out by the manager and task 2 is assigned to the
agent. The outcomes of the two tasks are then given by
\ qg1 = dPhP
\ qg2 = dDhD
(1)
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where the index nd denotes the case of non-delegation.
In the first-best case the total welfare of the involved parties is maximized by:
max
hP >hD
Zqg = (dPhP + (1 ) dDhD)
f
2
h2P 
f
2
h2D
which leads to the first-best eort levels given by
hqgIEP =
dP
f
hqgIED =
(1 ) dD
f =
Hence, the total welfare in case of non-delegation is equal to
ZqgIE = 
2d2P
2f +
(1 )2 d2D
2f = (2)
Next, assume that the critical task 1 is assigned to the agent and task 2 is carried out by
the manager. Now, the outcomes of both tasks are given by
\ g1 = dDhD
\ g2 = dPhP
(3)
where the index d denotes the case of delegation.
In this case, the welfare maximization problem becomes
max
hP >hD
Z g = ((1 ) dPhP + dDhD)
f
2
h2P 
f
2
h2D
which leads to the first-best eort levels described by
hgIEP =
(1 ) dP
f
hgIED =
dD
f =
Hence, the total welfare in case of delegation is equal to
Z gIE = (1 )
2 d2P
2f +
2d2D
2f = (4)
Comparing (2) and (4), delegation is e!cient if and only if
dP  dD=
Proposition 1 In the e!cient task allocation the critical task should be allocated to the agent
if and only if her ability is at least as high as the manager’s ability, i.e. dP  dD= Otherwise,
the critical task should better be assigned to the manager.
It is straightforward that maximizing the total welfare requires that the critical task (i.e.
the task with a higher impact on the total output) to be carried out by the individual with the
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higher ability. Moreover, the positive welfare eect of delegation is the greater the higher the
agent’s ability is. However, it is not obvious that the welfare maximizing task allocation will
generally be implemented when the task allocation is chosen by the manager.
3.2 Optimal delegation choice of a fully rational manager
Assume that the task allocation is chosen by a fully rational manager, maximizing his individual
utility. Assume that the manager does not delegate, i.e. the critical task (task 1) is carried out
by the manager and other task (task 2) is assigned to the agent. The outcomes of the two tasks
are then given by (1).
In contrast to the first-best case, the manager’s utility is now maximized with:
max
hP
XqgP =
1
2
(dPhP + (1 ) dDhD)
f
2
h2P
which leads to his individually optimal eort level described by
hqgWP =
dP
2f =
Furthermore, the agent’s optimization is given by
max
hD
XqgD =
1
2
(dPhP + (1 ) dDhD)
f
2
h2D
and her individually optimal eort level is
hqgWD =
(1 ) dD
2f =
Since we assume that the manager has perfect information about the agent’s ability, his
utility is equal to
XqgWP =
2d2P
8f +
(1 )2 d2D
4f = (5)
Next, assume that the manager delegates, i.e. the critical task 1 is assigned to the agent
and task 2 is carried out by the manager. Now, the outcomes of both tasks are given by (3).
In this case, the manager’s optimization problem is
max
hP
XgP =
1
2
((1 ) dPhP + dDhD)
f
2
h2P
with
h gWP =
(1 ) dP
2f
as his individually optimal eort level.
For the agent, the optimization is given by
max
hD
XgD =
1
2
((1 ) dPhP + dDhD)
f
2
h2D
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which leads to an individually optimal eort level of
hgWD =
dD
2f =
Hence, the manager’s utility in case of delegation is equal to
XgWP =
(1 )2 d2P
8f +
2d2D
4f = (6)
Now, by comparing (5) and (6), the fully rational manager chooses delegation if and only
if
dP 
s
2dD=
It is straightforward that the fully rational manager prefers to delegate the critical task as
long as his own ability is smaller than the agent’s ability, i.e. as long as dP  dD. Moreover,
note that there is a range of values (i.e. dP 5
¡
dD;
s
2dD
¤
) for which the manager also delegates
the critical task to the agent, even though his ability is strictly higher than the agent’s ability.
This is due to the fact that in equilibrium the critical task 1 is performed with higher levels of
eort and, thus, with a higher eort cost, than the other task. Hence, delegating the task may
pay, because delegation reduces the manager’s eort cost more than it reduces the expected
outcome of the critical task when it is performed by the agent with the somewhat lower ability.
As the fully rational manager cannot commit to the e!cient task allocation this may lead to
ine!cient job distributions and lower total welfare in equilibrium. However, once the agent’s
ability falls below the threshold
I
2
2 dP , the manager prefers to perform the critical task himself,
because the benefit from the own higher ability surpasses the higher eort cost.
3.3 Optimal delegation choice of an overconfident manager
In this section, we examine the task allocation choice of an overconfident manager, assuming
that overconfidence leads to an overly optimistic perception of the own abilities. Recall that
the self-perceived ability of an overconfident manager is given by
dRFP = dP + e> with e A 0=
Given this slight modification of the model, we derive the equilibrium choices of the over-
confident manager and the agent and compare these to the case with a fully rational manager.
By substituting dRFP for dP and following the same procedure applied in the previous chapter,
we derive the condition under which the overconfident manager chooses delegation:
dP 
s
2dD  e=
By decreasing the right-hand side of the inequality, any positive self-perception bias e lowers
the threshold for non-delegation, reducing the range of values for which delegation is chosen by
the overconfident manager. Hence, it is obvious that an overconfident manager is more likely
to hoard responsibility than a fully rational manager of the same true ability. In particular, the
higher the self-perception bias e, the larger the range of ability values for which a fully rational
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manager delegates the critical task, but an overconfident manager will not, i.e. the greater the
range of ability values in which the critical task is carried out by the manager. We summarize
our findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 With perfect information on the agent’s ability parameter dD, any positive self-
perception bias e A 0 leads to responsibility hoarding by the overconfident manager. In particular,
the range of manager types choosing delegation is strictly decreasing in the managers’ degree of
overconfidence e.
As we have shown in the last section, fully rational managers cannot commit to the e!cient
task allocation as they have an incentive to lower their own eort cost by delegating the critical
task to the agent as long as the agent’s ability is su!ciently high. In contrast, overconfident
managers overestimate their own ability, and therefore, allocate the critical task more often to
themselves than fully rational managers. In particular, overconfident managers are more likely
to hoard responsibility the larger their self-perception bias is. However, the task allocations
chosen by overconfident managers may be closer to the e!cient allocation than those of rational
managers. Hence, overconfidence can be considered as a commitment device for managers to
take more responsibilities and increase the e!ciency of the job distribution, positively aecting
the total welfare.
3.4 Is overconfidence beneficial or harmful?
As we have shown in the previous section, overconfidence may lead to less delegation and can,
thus, improve the e!ciency of the task allocations. Since an overconfident manager in general
exerts more eort, the total output of the firm is often higher with an overconfident manager
than with a rational manager. The higher eort level, however, also leads to a higher cost of
eort provision for the overconfident manager. Hence, it is not clear whether the manager’s
overconfidence is generally beneficial or harmful with regard to total welfare. In this section,
we show that in many cases, including some in which the task allocation is not individually
optimal for the manager, overconfidence is beneficial regarding the total welfare of the involved
parties. Comparing the total welfare in equilibrium with a fully rational manager to that with
an overconfident manager, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If the manager’s self-perception bias e is on a moderate level relative to his true
ability (i.e. e ? 2dP) and his true ability is su!ciently high (i.e. dP A
s
2dD) or su!ciently
low (i.e. dP ?
s
2dD  e), the total welfare of the involved parties in equilibrium is strictly
higher with an overconfident manager than with a fully rational manager. For any ability value
of the manager between those two thresholds (i.e.
s
2dD  e  dP 
s
2dD), this result still
holds if the manager’s true ability is at least as high as the agent’s true ability (i.e. dP  dD).
Proof. See the appendix.
This result has several interesting implications. First, note that the manager’s overcon-
fidence is not generally harmful and can even be beneficial for the total welfare, if it is not
too strong. On the one hand, the overconfident manager overestimates his own ability, and
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therefore, exerts more eort than the fully rational manager, irrespective of the task alloca-
tion. On the other hand, the overconfident manager also expects a higher total outcome when
carrying out the critical task himself, and thus, is more likely than his fully rational counter-
part to allocate the critical task to himself. This type of responsibility hoarding behavior is
e!ciency enhancing, if the manager is more able than the agent. Hence, overconfidence helps
to reduce free-riding. Indeed, this positive incentive eect of manager overconfidence can even
over-compensate the negative eect of individually suboptimal task allocation as long as the
manager is at least as productive as the agent. Note that this finding is also in line with our
result from the first-best case stating that the delegation of the critical task is only e!cient if the
agent is more productive than the manager. In particular, the total welfare in equilibrium with
an overconfident manager is closer to the e!cient allocation than with a fully rational manager
of the same true ability. Hence, all involved parties may in fact benefit from a moderate level
of manager overconfidence.
3.5 Optimal degree of overconfidence
As the manager’s overconfidence can be beneficial for total welfare, it is straightforward to
proceed in our analysis with the determination of the optimal degree of overconfidence with
respect to the total welfare. In this regard, we can show
Proposition 4 The total welfare is highest if the manager’s self-perception bias (or degree of
overconfidence) is equal to his true ability, i.e. eW = dP .
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that the positive welfare eect of overconfidence is strictly increasing in the manager’s
true ability. Intuitively, the higher the manager’s true ability is, the less harmful is his biased
self-perception, the more likely responsibility hoarding may positively aect the total welfare.
Moreover, it is also straightforward to see that the manager’s eort choice exactly matches the
e!cient level, if the degree of his overconfidence is equal to his true ability. We summarize this
result in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If a manager’s degree of overconfidence is equal to the true value of his ability,
i.e. e = dP , his eort choice in equilibrium is exactly equal to the e!cient eort level, both in
case of delegation and non-delegation.
Proof. The results follows directly by substituting dP for e into the overconfident manager’s
incentive conditions.
4 Persistence of the manager’s overconfidence and the under-
estimation of the agent’s ability
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that manager overconfidence can lead to less
delegation, resulting in more e!cient task allocations in a perfect information setting. The
question that remains to be answered is whether the managers’ overconfidence and responsibility
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hoarding behavior can persist over time, given imperfect information and feedback. If managers
quickly learn to correct their overconfident assessment of the own ability, then overconfidence
and responsibility hoarding will not persist. However, if the feedback from previous outcomes
cannot be used to correct overconfidence, we can establish that responsibility hoarding can be
a persistent phenomenon with a sustained eect on organizational performance.
We derive the conditions under which overconfidence (and responsibility hoarding) can
persist, when managers have imperfect information on the agent’s ability and receive feedback
only on previous performance. We restrict our analysis to the case that the manager only receives
feedback on the total output of the firm (or the organizational unit). Obviously, persistence of
overconfidence with more exact information, e.g. on all ability and eort parameters, would not
be feasible. In the more realistic situation that we analyze, we assume that the agent’s ability
parameter is her private information. More specifically, we assume that the manager uses an
estimate of the agent’s ability parameter denoted by bdD. Since, the feedback information is
restricted to the total output, the overconfident manager faces one known parameter (his own
eort level), two unknown parameters (the agent’s ability and eort level), and one parameter
that he believes to know, but actually does not (his own ability). Under these circumstances, we
show that the overconfident manager may not be able to learn that his self-assessment is biased,
because he can construct a consistent model that explains the observed total outcome with an
overestimated own ability parameter and an underestimated ability parameter for the agent.3
As long as the productivity of the agent can be underestimated su!ciently, the manager’s
overconfidence can persist. We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If the agent’s true ability dD is not known to the manager and su!ciently
high, i.e. dD  (13)
p
(dPe+ e2), the manager’s overconfidence persists, because the manager
rationalizes the observed outcome information by underestimating the agent’s ability. The higher
the manager’s self-perception bias e is, the stronger the underestimation of the agent’s ability
will be.
Proof. See the appendix.
A straightforward corollary to the proposition in this section is concerned with the limits
of persistent overconfidence:
Corollary 2 Manager overconfidence is persistent at some positive level i dD A 0.
The corollary simply points out that depending on the ability parameters there always
might be some level of overconfidence that is persistent, as long as the agent’s ability is not
zero. Intuitively, it is clear that overconfidence can only persist, as long as the overconfident
manager has the possibility to underestimate the agent’s contribution to the observed total
output, and thus, the ability of the agent. The range for the underestimation drops if the
agent’s ability is decreased, leaving less and less room for persistently overconfident managers.
If the agent’s ability is zero, she would not contribute at all to the total output and persistent
3Young (2002)shows that some games cannot be learned by rational players and demonstrates a class of
learning environments in which convergence to equilibrium behavior fails to occur for any learning process,
including the Bayesian updating of objectively correct priors.
11
overconfidence would no longer be possible. But, note that the extreme case of zero ability has
no empirical relevance, because it describes a situation in which the agent cannot contribute
to the output of the firm. Hence, the corollary shows that for any situation with empirical
relevance, there is at least some level of persistent overconfidence, leading to some amount of
persistent responsibility hoarding by overconfident managers.
5 Discussion
Using the results of the sections above, we discuss the range of optimal and persistent manager
overconfidence and responsibility hoarding constellations in this section. The constellations are
exhibited in Figure 1. It shows the four functions that determine the dierent outcome regions
in the ability space. The manager’s ability is plotted on the horizontal and the agent’s (possibly
estimated) ability is plotted on the vertical axis.4
The dashed bisecting line depicts the function dD = dP which separates the area of e!cient
delegation choices above the line from the area of e!cient non-delegation choices below the line.
The solid line running through the origin depicts the function dD =
I
2
2 dP and separates the
area of individually optimal delegation (i.e. rational delegation) above the line from the area of
individually optimal non-delegation (i.e. rational non-delegation) below the line. The area of
individually optimal delegation is larger than the area of individually optimal non-delegation,
because — as we show in section 3 — as long as the agent’s ability is not too low, the rational
manager prefers to avoid the high cost of eort associated with performing the critical task
himself.
The solid line that intersects the vertical axis above the origin depicts the function bdD =I
2
2 (dP + e) and separates the area of delegation (the dotted area above the line) from the area
of non-delegation (below the line) chosen by an overconfident manager. Note that in the dotted
area both the fully rational and the overconfident manager choose to delegate the critical task
to the agent, while below the line running through the origin (the hatched area), both the
fully rational and the overconfident manager choose to carry out the critical task themselves.
The area enclosed by the functions dD =
I
2
2 dP and bdD = I22 (dP + e) contains all ability
constellations for responsibility hoarding, in which the overconfident manager still assigns the
critical task to himself, but the rational manager does not.
The function dD = (13)
p
(dPe+ e2) separates the area of persistent (above) from the area
of non-persistent manager overconfidence (below). Note that this separation is only valid in the
area where responsibility hoarding occurs, i.e. the area enclosed by the functions dD =
I
2
2 dP
and bdD = I22 (dP + e). Our graph shows a large area of non-persistent (the shaded area
and the dark grey area) and a relatively small area of persistent manager overconfidence with
responsibility hoarding by the overconfident manager (the white area and the white-dotted
area). Intuitively, it seems clear that manager overconfidence has a lower chance to persist, if
the manager carries out the critical task himself. The reason is that the overconfident manager
always has more room to rationalize his overly optimistic self-perception by underestimating
the agent’s contribution when the critical task is carried out by the agent.
4We have fixed  = 0=55 and e = 4 to make a two-dimensional plot possible.
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Figure 1: Range of optimal and persistent overconfidence and responsibility-hoarding constel-
lations depending on manager’s and agent’s abilities
The dierence between the tasks concerning their impact on the firm outcome, i.e. the
value of the parameter , in fact, aects the location of the persistency curve (the function
dD = (13)
p
(dPe+ e2)) and, thus, the size of persistent overconfidence areas in the graph (the
white area and the white-dotted area). The more important the critical task is when compared
to the other task (i.e. the higher ), the smaller are the areas of persistent overconfidence and
responsibility hoarding. The more asymmetric a task constellation is, the more di!cult it is for
the overconfident manager to find a feasible set of parameters, in which the overestimation of
the own ability can be compensated by underestimating the ability of the agent.
A similar but more subtle eect exists concerning the self-perception bias e. As e increases,
the area of responsibility hoarding obviously also increases. Note, however, that an increase
in the level of overconfidence e also means that the persistency curve shifts upwards, reducing
the area of persistent responsibility hoarding. Hence, more overconfident managers will tend to
carry out the critical task more frequently, but are also more likely to receive feedback that lets
them revise their self-assessment and reduce their overconfidence.
Another implication of our analysis is that both the manager’s and the agent’s abilities
must be relatively high to allow for persistent manager overconfidence. This is because the
agent’s ability must be high enough to provide the relatively high degree of underestimation
that persistency of overconfidence requires. Since persistent overconfidence of the manager is
more likely to occur, when the ability levels of the two players are rather close to each other,
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responsibility hoarding is most likely to be observed, when the overconfident manager’s true
ability is close to the ability level of a high ability agent.
Finally, there are constellations of ability parameters for which manager overconfidence
and responsibility hoarding have a sustained eect on the total welfare of all involved parties
(the white area and the white-dotted area). However, persistent manager overconfidence and
responsibility hoarding are welfare increasing only if the manager is indeed more able than the
agent (the white-dotted area). This finding is in line with our results of the first-best case that
the critical task should always be carried out by the more able individual due to its higher
impact on total outcome.
6 Conclusions and managerial implications
We study the consequences of manager overconfidence for organizational performance in a set-
ting in which the manager chooses the allocation of tasks. We prove that an overconfident
manager may exhibit responsibility hoarding behavior, i.e. assign the critical task more often
to himself than a rational manager would. We show that while responsibility hoarding generally
decreases the manager’s individual utility, it tends to increase the firm output and the total
welfare of the involved parties, when compared to the case of a fully rational manager. The
reason for this seemingly counter-intuitive result is that overconfident managers generally exert
higher levels of eort than rational managers, because they overestimate their own productiv-
ity. In this regard, overconfidence counterbalances shirking, causing managers to take up more
responsibility and to reduce the ine!ciency of their eort minimizing task allocation.
Hence, our results imply that firms will not generally avoid overconfident and responsibility
hoarding managers, but may even prefer them to fully rational managers. In a situation where
the firm cannot establish a contract to enforce the e!cient allocation of tasks, moderate over-
confidence of a manager can mitigate the negative eects of free-riding. The firm may prefer to
hire a moderately overconfident manager to avoid the incomplete contract problem. In connec-
tion with the well-established evidence that men are generally more overconfident than women
(see e.g. Barber and Odean (2001), Correll (2001), Bengtsson et al. (2005)), our result may
also provide a further possible explanation why leadership positions are more often occupied by
men than by women.5
Moreover, we have shown that an overconfident manager’s biased self-perception and his
responsibility hoarding behavior can persist, as long as the manager can rationalize observed
outcomes, by underestimating the ability of the agent. Notably, the probability of persistent
overconfidence does not only depend on the level of overconfidence, but also on the absolute
level of the players’ true abilities. The higher the ability levels in a workplace, the more likely
it is to observe persistent overconfidence. This is due to the fact that high-ability agents can
be underestimated to a greater extent than low-ability agents. The more an agent’s ability
can be underestimated, the easier it is for an overconfident manager to rationalize the observed
output without having to adapt the overestimation of his own ability. Hence, responsibility
hoarding is more likely to be widespread and persistent in workplaces with high ability workers
5For a similar result, based on a dierent type of equilibrium see also Palomino and Peyrache (2010).
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and low accountability of work output than in settings with low ability workers or with a high
traceability of exerted work eort.
Responsibility hoarding is also more likely to persist in situations, in which the asymmetry
between tasks is relatively low. The more similar tasks are in their impact on total output, the
easier it is for the overconfident manager to rationalize the observed total output by underes-
timating the contribution of the agent. If, in contrast, the task that the agent performs has
very little impact on total output, the overconfident manager will find it di!cult to rationalize
observed low output levels without having to adapt the biased assessment of his own ability.
Note that if there is persistent responsibility hoarding at a workplace, the agent’s work
satisfaction will most probably decrease over time, due to the continued underestimation of
her true ability. Hence, while the biased perception of the overconfident manager motivates
him to exert more eort than a rational manager would, it may also cause lower satisfaction
levels amongst the agents, leading to more tensions at the workplace and higher turnover rates.
Interestingly, a high turnover rate amongst agents may even further support the persistence of
the manager’s overconfidence, because a constant input of new agents tends to reduce the power
of the statistical evidence that would be needed for the overconfident manager to discover his
self-perception bias.
Finally, our analysis also implies that allowing overconfident employees to choose their
tasks may lead to less free-riding in management than predicted in a model with fully rational
employees. Especially when the cost of a centrally planned task allocation is high, allowing
overconfident employees to volunteer for high-eort tasks may be a cost e!cient second-best
solution.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 3
First, we consider the case if dP A
s
2dD. In this case, both a fully rational manager and an
overconfident manager will choose non-delegation. This is also the individually optimal task
allocation for the manager. The total welfare with a fully rational manager is equal to the sum
of the utilities of manager and agent which is given by
ZqgW = XqgWP + XqgWD (7)
=
³
dPhqgWP + (1 ) dDhqgWD
´
 f
2
hqgW2P 
f
2
hqgW2D
=
32d2P
8f +
3 (1 )2 d2D
8f =
With an overconfident manager it is equal to
ZRFqgW = XRFqgWP + XRFqgWD (8)
=
³
dPhRFqgWP + (1 ) dDhRFqgWD
´
 f
2
hRFqgW2P 
f
2
hRFqgW2D
=
32d2P
8f +
3 (1 )2 d2D
8f +
2 (2dP  e) e
8f =
Comparing (7) and (8), it follows directly that the total welfare with an overconfident
manager is strictly higher than with a fully rational manager if e ? 2dP =
Second, we consider the case if dP ?
s
2dD e= In this case, both a fully rational manager
and an overconfident manager will choose delegation, which is also the individually optimal task
allocation for the manager. The total welfare with a fully rational manager is given by
Z gW = XgWP + XgWD (9)
=
³
(1 ) dPhgWP + dDhgWD
´
 f
2
hgW2P 
f
2
hgW2D
=
3 (1 )2 d2P
8f +
32d2D
8f =
With an overconfident manager total welfare is
ZRFgW = XRFgWP + XRFgWD (10)
=
³
(1 ) dPhRFgWP + dDhRFgWD
´
 f
2
hRFgW2P 
f
2
hRFgW2D
=
3 (1 )2 d2P
8f +
32d2D
8f +
(1 )2 (2dP  e) e
8f =
Again by comparing (9) and (10), the total welfare with an overconfident manager is strictly
higher than with a fully rational manager if e ? 2dP =
Finally, we consider the non-trivial case, in which dP 
s
2dD  dP + e. In this case, a
fully rational manager chooses to delegate the critical task to the agent, while an overconfident
manager carries out the critical task himself.
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Comparing (8) and (9), the total welfare is higher with an overconfident manager if
(2 1) (dP + dD) (dP  dD) +
2
3
(2dP  e) e  0
Note that as long as the manager’s ability is at least as high as the agent’s, i.e. dP  dD,
and the manager’s degree of overconfidence is on a moderate level, i.e. e ? 2dP , the total
welfare with an overconfident manager is higher than with a fully rational manager.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4
First, we consider the case dP A
s
2dD  e, in which an overconfident manager chooses not to
delegate the critical task. In this case, the total welfare is given by
XRFqgW = 3
2d2P
8f +
3 (1 )2 d2D
8f +
2 (2dP  e) e
8f =
By solving the following optimization problem
max
e
XRFqgW
v=w= e A
s
2dD  dP
we obtain
CXRFqgW
Ce
·
= 0
/ 
2
4f (dP  e) = 0
/ eW = dP =
Note that the second-order condition is automatically satisfied as XRFqgW is strictly concave
in e. Furthermore, the constraint e A
s
2dDdP is also satisfied as long as dP A
I
2
2 dD= Hence,
eW = dP if dP A
s
2
2
dD
Second, we consider the case dP 
s
2dD  e, in which an overconfident manager chooses
to delegate the critical task. In this case, the total welfare is given by
XRFgW = 3 (1 )
2 d2P
8f +
32d2D
8f +
(1 )2 (2dP  e) e
8f =
Again, by solving the following optimization problem
max
e
XRFgW
v=w= e 
s
2dD  dP
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we obtain
CXRFgW
Ce
·
= 0
/ (1 )
2
4f (dP  e) = 0
/ eW = dP =
Note that the second-order condition is automatically satisfied as XRFgW is strictly concave
in e. Furthermore the constraint e 
s
2dDdP is also satisfied as long as dP 
I
2
2 dD= Hence,
eW = dP if dP 
s
2
2
dD
and the optimal degree of overconfidence is given eW = dP .
7.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We prove the results by first analyzing the case of non-delegation and then the case of delegation.
We derive the two conditions for sustained overconfidence. We then show that as long as
the critical task contributes more to the total output than the other task, i.e. as long as
1
2 ?  ? 1, the condition stated in the proposition is binding for both delegation and non-
delegation situations. Finally, we show that the higher the manager’s self-perception bias, the
more the agent’s ability is underestimated.
1. Persistence of overconfidence in the case of non-delegation
Our essential assumption is that the manager will not revise his assessment of the own
ability as long as he observes outcomes that can be rationalized by varying the two unknown
parameters, i.e. the agent’s ability and eort level. As long as any observed outcome can
be rationalized by the manager, overconfidence is persistent. In the following, we derive the
su!cient condition for the persistence of overconfidence in case of non-delegation.
Recall that the total output in case of non-delegation is given by
\ RFqgW = dPhRFqgWP + (1 ) dDhRFqgWD =
If an overconfident manager observes this total output, he overestimates his own contribu-
tion and underestimates the agent’s contribution as follows:
\ RFqgS =  (dP + e) hRFqgWP + (1 )bdDbhRFqgWD =
This biased model (i.e. the overconfident rationalization of the observed output) is only
feasible as long as the following condition holds:
\ RFqgW   (dP + e) hRFqgWP
/ dPhRFqgWP + (1 ) dDhRFqgWD   (dP + e) hRFqgWP
/ dD 

(1 )
p
(dPe+ e2)=
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Next, we check for the degree of underestimation of the agent’s contribution in case of non-
delegation. Let   dDbdD denote the underestimation of the agent’s ability. Since \ RFqgW =
\ RFqgS we can determine the level of underestimation by solving the following equation:
\ RFqgW = \ RFqgS
/ dPhRFqgWP + (1 ) dDhRFqgWD =  (dP + e) hRFqgWP + (1 )bdDbhRFqgWD
/ dD  bdD = 2
(1 )2
dPe+ e2
(dD + bdD)
/  = 
2
(1 )2
dPe+ e2
(dD + bdD) A 0=
Since  is higher than zero, we have established a positive underestimation of the agent’s
ability that increases in the manager’s self-perception bias e.
2. Persistence of overconfidence in the case of delegation
Now, we derive the su!cient condition for the persistence of overconfidence in case the
manager delegates the critical task to the agent. Recall that the total output in the case of
delegation is
\ RFgW = (1 ) dPhRFgWP + dDhRFgWD =
The overconfident manager rationalizes the observation of this output as follows
\ RFgS = (1 ) (dP + e) hRFgWP + bdDbhRFgWD =
The overestimation of the own contribution (underestimation of the agent’s ability) is only
feasible as long as the following condition holds:
\ RFgW  (1 ) (dP + e) hRFgWP
/ (1 ) dPhRFgWP + dDhRFgWD  (1 ) (dP + e) hRFgWP
/ dD 
(1 )

p
(dPe+ e2)=
Analogous to the non-delegation case, we check for the degree of underestimation of the
agent’s contribution in case of delegation. Let   dD  bdD denote the underestimation of the
agent’s ability. Since \ gW = \ gS we can determine the level of underestimation by solving the
following equation:
\ RFgW = \ RFgS
/ (1 ) dPhRFgWP + dDhRFgWD = (1 ) (dP + e) hRFgWP + bdDbhRFgWD
/  = (1 )
2
2
dPe+ e2
(dD + bdD) A 0=
Again, we find that  is higher than zero, i.e. the overconfident manager underestimates
the agent’s ability and the underestimation increases in the manager’s self-perception bias e.
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3. General conditions for both cases
Taking the results of the two parts together, we can show that for all cases in which the
critical task contributes more to the total output than the other task, i.e. as long as 12 ?  ? 1,
the condition for persistence in the second case (delegation) is generally more restrictive than
in the first case:

1  A
1 
 > for any  5
µ
1
2
> 1
¶
=
Hence, if dD  (13)
p
(dPe+ e2) is true, then the condition dD  (13)
p
(dPe+ e2) also holds,
allowing us to use the former as a general condition in the proposition.
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